RESEARCH BRIEF
Demystifying Gray Zone Conflict: A Typology of Conflict Dyads and
Instruments of Power in Colombia, 2002-present
OVERVIEW
This investigation explains the dynamics of Gray Zone conflict in Colombia with particular emphasis on the role of violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) and the instruments of power utilized. We define Gray Zone, in concert with a broader research effort, as “a
conceptual space between peace and war, occurring when actors purposefully use multiple instruments of power to achieve
political-security objectives with activities that are ambiguous or cloud attribution and exceed the threshold of ordinary
competition, yet fall below the level of large-scale direct military conflict, and threaten U.S. and allied interests by challenging,
undermining, or violating international customs, norms, or laws.” 1 This research aims to assist practitioners and policy makers
in determining how the types of actors involved in a conflict can influence which instruments of power deserve special
consideration in that conflict.
PROJECT BACKGROUND
This research explores the most recent phase (2002-present) of Colombia’s Gray Zone conflict, which involves myriad, diverse
types of VNSAs utilizing the vast majority of the seven instruments of power (diplomatic, informational, military, economic,
financial, intelligence and legal) to achieve their aims. In order to help bound the scope of what Special Operations Forces (SOF)
must consider when identifying potential non-state partners and determining which instruments of power to equip them to use,
this report aggregates groups by type (e.g., Marxist insurgents, right-wing paramilitaries) and examines the different dyadic
configurations of belligerents (e.g., Marxist insurgents versus right-wing paramilitaries). This approach is effective for two
reasons. First, groups of the same type (largely) behave similarly. Second, the average conflict dyad includes just two-and-a-half
of the seven instruments of power.
OUR APPROACH
Colombia has experienced more than 50 years of multi-party civil war. At various times, the conflict involved six distinct leftist
insurgencies, 16 organized criminal (BACRIM) syndicates and a multitude of right-wing paramilitaries, in addition to the state. At
certain points, all of these diverse types of actors have chosen to cooperate with different types of belligerents involved in the
fighting. At other times, they have all violently clashed with one another.
This investigation focuses on six conflict
dyads: government versus insurgents,
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Interestingly, the instruments of power used and the preponderate Zones of conflict also exhibit considerable variation
depending on the configuration of a given conflict dyad. For example, while figure 1 shows that paramilitary forces are the most
heavily reliant on Gray Zone activities, figure 2 shows that Gray acts are conspicuously absent from the dyad Government versus
Paramilitaries. Specifically, it shows that of the instruments of power employed by both actors in that dyad, three entailed White
activities and one involved Black action.

Figure 2: Zones of Conflict by Dyad
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In summary, this research shows that actors of the
same type can be aggregated, without substantial
loss of fidelity, insofar as they behave similarly.
Moreover, further simplification is possible by
examining dyadic pairs of conflicting belligerents (as
opposed to all parties at once). Doing so limits the
number of instruments of power that need to be
considered, while identifying the Zones of conflict
that predominate in a given dyad. This will enable
SOF to quickly develop an understanding of complex
Gray Zone conflicts and identify and equip local
partners to operate effectively therein. Nevertheless,
it should be noted that while simplification can be
helpful, intervention in Gray Zone environments
requires keen situational awareness at the microlevel. Without an intimate knowledge of the local
dynamics of a conflict, practitioners risk negative
externalities, such as interventions against one
opposition force that inadvertently strengthens
another.

METHOD
This research leverages open source investigation involving both primary and secondary sources. It benefited from 13 months
of recently completed field research in Colombia and Peru. The report is the product of the initial stage (future deliverables are
discussed in the section, Future Directions, below) of START’s research on Gray Zone conflict. Consequently, the approach is
inductive. Specifically it utilizes “thick description” and process tracing. These two techniques are ideally suited for developing
complex theories and for teasing out causal processes.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This research is part of a larger project, which also involves qualitative case studies of two additional (and very different) Gray
Zone conflicts: Ukraine and Libya. In addition, frequentist statistical analysis is being conducted to model escalatory and deescalatory trends in all three cases. Bayesian network analysis will also be employed for the Libyan case.
RESEARCHERS AND CONT ACT INFORMATION
The author of this research brief and the full report it is based on is Barnett S. Koven, Senior Researcher at the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The report is part of START project, “Shadows of
Violence: Empirical Assessments of Threats, Coercion and Gray Zones” led by Amy Pate. To provide feedback, or for any
correspondence relating to this research, or for a copy of the full report on this topic, please contact:
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